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Abstract
We consider a three-stage game in which symmetric firms decide
whether to invest in a cost-reducing technology, then they have the
possibility to merge (forming coalitions), and eventually, in the third
stage, a Cournot oligopoly game is played by the resulting firms (coali-
tions). We show that, contrary to the existing literature, the monopoly
market structure may fail to form even when the number of initial firms
is just three. We then introduce a weighted sharing rule and show that
a situation in which all firms acquire the cost-reducing asset cannot
be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The study of coalition of players goes back to the first book on game theory:
the seminal contribution of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). After this
seminal work, the research on coalition was mainly characterized by models
studying coalitions in “characteristic form”. These models postulates the
existence of the grand coalition, assuming away any issue concerning the
process of coalition formation. The focus was on how the value generated by
the coalition would be divided among the members. Interestingly, it is only
recently that economic theory has begun to pay the deserved attention to the
problem of coalition formation. A recent stream of research has the merit of
explicitly considering the formation of coalitions and the externalities that
arise among them. The scope of application of this theoretical breakthrough
spans over all fields of economics. Any association of economic agents can
be seen as a coalition, from political parties and federation of states, to firms
and cartels.
The theory of coalitions in Oligopolies, was one of the first application
proposed1. In this case the players of the game are firms which can form
coalitions in order to compete in the market. In practice, these coalitions
can be thought of as partnerships, cartels or horizontal merger. The eco-
nomic theory on horizontal mergers considers two main reasons for merging:
reducing competition in the market, and exploiting synergies. The latter is
characterized by the presence of economies of scale in some aspects of the
1See as a reference Brown and Chiang [2003].
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production process. For instance, through merging it is possible to eliminate
duplications of fixed costs and increase specialization. Most of the models
take the synergy among firms as an exogenous factor, focusing on the ef-
fects of concentration on the equilibrium social welfare. If no synergies come
from concentration, the effect on social welfare is clearly negative – monopoly
reduces social welfare. In case of synergies, however, the answer is not so sim-
ple. The benefits from synergies could compensate (or offset) the negative
impact of concentration.
1.2 Our contribution
We propose a model of mergers and acquisitions in which the synergy result-
ing from concentration is endogenous. Each firm is ex-ante identical, they
have the possibility to invest and modify their level of efficiency. As a conse-
quence the decision to merge would depend on this initial investment. The
investment consists on the acquisition of a particular asset which reduces
the production costs of the firm (and of the firm resulting from the merger).
This, to our knowledge, is the first work which directly addresses the invest-
ment issue in a coalition model2. The other important contribution is on
the theory of coalition formation. We propose a sharing rule that accounts
for the possible asymmetry among firms in the second stage3. In fact, with
2Hart and Moore [1990] consider the effect of asset ownership on the formation of a
coalition of players, but they postulates the formation of the grand coalition, using the
Shapley value as sharing rule. Espinosa and Macho-Stadler [2003], consider a model in
which coalitions form in the first stage and then members decide the effort to put in cost
reduction. They introduce the problem of moral hazard. However, their benchmark case
– perfect information – is similar to our model but with a reverse order: in our model
players commit themselves to a particular “effort” before coalitions are formed.
3To our knowledge few papers consider coalitions with asymmetric players, and they all
restrict the analysis to particular types of coalition structures. Many of these papers deal
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symmetric players, Ray and Vohra [1999] show that the “equal” sharing rule
results as the unique equilibrium of a sequential coalition formation game.
We consider a three-stage game in which ex-ante symmetric firms decide
whether to invest (acquire the asset), then, in the second stage, they can
form coalitions4 (e.g. merging), and eventually, in the third stage, a Cournot
oligopoly game is played among the resulting firms (coalitions). In order to
characterize the coalition formation game we rely on the concept of stabil-
ity introduced by Ray and Vohra [1997], in which a coalition structure is
stable if it can be supported by an equilibrium binding agreement (EBA)
strategy profile. We deal with the cooperative behaviour inside a coalition
by assuming an exogenous sharing rule. In this case, the third stage can be
represented by a valuation, a function which maps coalition structures into
vectors of individual payoffs.
We characterize the impact of investing in a cost-saving asset on the merg-
ing strategy of each firm, and hence on the resulting market structure. We
found that two main forces drive the merging strategy of firms: a “Stigler”
effect and a “synergy” effect. The former, maintained by Stigler [1950], ac-
counts for the incentive of each firm not to participate in a merger. Basically,
Stigler claims that a firm which do not participate in a merger may enjoy a
positive externality because of the reduction in the number of firms in the
market (lower competition). The latter, considered in our model, accounts
for the possibility that firms reduce their costs by merging, i.e. the resulting
with international agreements, either on environmental or trade issues, and all of them
consider games in which only one non-degenerate coalition (a coalition with two or more
members) can form. See for a reference Carraro [1997], and Yi [1997].
4That represents any type of agreement in which firms in the coalition set quantity
cooperatively, and share their production technology.
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firm would be more efficient. Therefore, the two forces work in different di-
rections. We show that the acquisition of the cost-saving asset influences the
market structure in a counterintuitive way. With three firms and no asset,
monopoly (the grand coalition) is always a stable market structure, while if
all firms acquire the asset the monopoly structure is no more stable, either
firms do not merge or only two of them merge. This is in contrast with both
Bloch [1996] and Ray and Vohra [1997], where a similar game with three
firms always leads to the grand coalition.
The main result of the model is that, when the investment decision is
endogenous, a situation in which two or more firms acquire the cost-saving
asset is never a (Subgame) Perfect Equilibrium of this game5. Indeed, under
some conditions only one firm invests and the resulting market structure is
a monopoly (the three firms merge). This counterintuitive result seems to
suggest that, the asset is not always a plus for a firm, it can be also a burden.
We will discuss this issue in more detail in the next sections.
The results of our model have also an important impact in terms of eco-
nomic policy. The equilibrium in which only one firm invests holds even if
the cost of the investment tends to zero. Therefore a government subsidy
aiming at increasing the efficiency of firms in the market has no impact. We
leave for future research the analysis of whether an anti-trust policy which
blocks the grand coalition may improve the incentive to invest of each firm.
5Technically we do not have a subgame perfect equilibrium, because in the second
stage we do not have a Nash equilibrium. However, the sequential rationality feature
of the SPE is maintained in our equilibrium. In the first stage the Nash equilibrium is
computed taking into account the equilibrium outcome on the other stage games.
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1.3 Alternative applications
The theoretical model we propose can be applied to any environment in
which players make an action prior to the decision to form coalitions. For
instance, we can consider individual workers, they can decide whether to
enter a specific market alone or to form a coalition with other agents. We
have in mind lawyers, consultants, state agents, all types of workers that can
compete in the market alone or through a partnership. In this scenario, the
investment decision can be thought of as human capital – the acquisition of a
certain skill by the worker. The main questions to address would be: how the
stability of a partnership is influenced by the possibility of acquiring human
capital.
Another possible application is the analysis of bidding rings. In this case,
bidders can make an investment which alters their payoff from the auctioned
object, influencing the stability of the ring.
1.4 The structure of the paper
We start by considering a model in which there are only three firms with
a binary investment decision: either acquire the asset or not. In order to
compare our results with the existing literature, we present a reduced form6
of the model in which all firms have acquired the asset and the “equal”
sharing rule is imposed; then, we consider the full model introducing a more
appropriate sharing rule, that we call weighted. We investigate how the
acquisition of the cost-saving technology modifies the incentives to merge.
We, then, look for a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this sequential game,
6It is a reduced form because the investment decision is exogenously given.
6
and draw conclusions in terms of policy and social welfare. A final section
conclude mentioning the limitations of our approach and the scope for future
research.
2 Set up of the model
Consider N = 3 identical firms. At date 1, each firm chooses an action xi for
i = 1, 2, 3, so that x ∈ X represents the vector of all actions, and X is the
set of available strategies7. At date 2, firms can merge (forming coalitions).
To avoid confusion we refer to the set of original firms as firms and to the
firms resulting from the merging process as coalitions8. The structure of
the market is represented by the set of coalition structures, P , where each
coalition is denoted by s and characterized by the number of members ms,
so that a coalition with ms = 1 is a firm that did not merge. The action
chosen by the firms participating in the merger is xs ⊆ x, i.e. xs represents
the vector of actions chosen by the subset of firms that merged creating a
new firm (coalition s). Notice that xs is a vector, while xi is a scalar. At
date 3, the resulting coalitions will compete a` la Cournot, and the profits
are shared among members of the same coalition according to the valuation
v : P → Rn.
The cost function of each coalition is characterized by the following marginal
cost:
cs = C0 − f(ms, xs) (1)
7Since players are symmetric at this stage X = Xi ∀ i.
8In the second stage of the model, even a firm which did not merge, it is referred to as
a coalition of one member.
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where f(ms, xs) : R(1+ms) → R, represents the effect of each firm on coalition
s marginal cost; this effect depends on the number of members, ms, and on
the action chosen by each of them in the first period xs. In other words,
the cost function of the new firm is characterized by a common cost factor
C0 and the access to the cost-saving assets of the merged firms. The merger
produces a synergy only if some of the firms have invested. This synergy
created can be specified in different ways. For instance, we could assume
that the asset each firm owns is productive only if shared with other firms,
cs = C0 −
[∑
i∈s
xi
]α
with α > 1 for a convex cost-saving function and 0 ≥ α ≥ 1 for a concave-cost
saving function. This assumption would provide a strong incentive to merge
for firms that owns an asset. Alternatively, following Brown and Chiang
[2003], we can model the marginal cost of each coalition as:
cs = C0 − α
∑
i∈s
xi − β
2
(∑
i∈s
xi
)2
where α represents the first order effect and β the second order effect of the
investment. With β = 0 we obtain a linear cost-saving function. In reality
all we need is to model some kind of synergy resulting from the merger of
firms in case they acquire the asset. For this reason, we simply consider a
linear synergy among firms.
Main assumptions of the model:
Assumption A Marginal Cost. The action taken at date 1, contributes to
8
the marginal cost of each coalition in the following way
cs = C0 − α
∑
i∈s
xi for all s ∈ Pk and Pk ∈ P (2)
where cs represents the marginal cost of coalition s, which is given by a
fix and common factor C0, linearly reduced by the investment of firms
in the coalition. The parameter α accounts for the degree of synergy
among coalition members9, we assume α > 0. This assures a positive
synergy effect when “efficient” firms merge (an efficient firm is a player
of the game with action x = 1). The firms’ investment linearly affects
the cost function of the firm (∂cs
∂xi
= −α for all i); the cost function
captures the efficiency gains from pooling efficient firms, if no efficient
firms participate in the merger the resulting coalition’s cost is the same
as the cost of each merging firm.
Assumption B Identical Action Cost. The cost of taking action xi is the
same for any i, and equal to φ; this reflects the ex-ante symmetry of
all firms.
Assumption C Binary investment choice We restrict the strategy set of
each firm, at time 1, to X = {0, 1}. As a consequence the cost of
action x = 1 is fixed and equal to φ ∈ R+. In other words, there is only
one type of asset firms can acquire. Each firm cannot acquire more
than one asset. And finally, there is no competition for the assets, i.e.
they are always available assets.
9See for instance Perry and Porter [1985], for an analysis of the synergy influencing
horizontal mergers among firms. In their model, however, the decision to acquire the cost
reducing asset is not endogenous.
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In this section we characterize the last two stages of the game. Firstly,
we compute the Cournot Oligopoly equilibrium with many coalitions and
(possibly) different marginal costs. Secondly, we characterize the coalition
formation game applying Ray and Vohra [1997]’s Equilibrium Binding Agree-
ments stability concept.
2.1 Cournot Equilibrium
We assume that each coalition produces the same good, and they face the
same linear demand P = a − bQ, where P is the market price and Q the
total output of the industry; the parameters of the demand function are both
positive, a, b > 0.
The Cournot equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions,
where S represents the number of coalitions in a specific market structure:
Industry Output Q = (a−c¯)S
b(S+1)
dQ
dS
> 0
Market Price P = a+Sc¯
S+1
dP
dS
< 0
Firm Output qs =
a+
P
j 6=s cj−Scs
(S+1)b
dqs
dS
< 0
Firm Profit pis =
1
b
[
a+
P
j 6=s cj−Scs
(S+1)b
]2
pis
dS
< 0
We are interested in the last expression, which represents the worth
(profit) of coalition s. Clearly, this worth depends not only on the marginal
cost of coalition s, but also on the marginal cost of the other coalitions j 6= s,
and hence it ultimately depends on the market structure and the action cho-
sen by all firms i ∈ N .
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2.2 Coalition Formation
The coalition formation game is characterized by two critical features: (i)
how firms influence the cost of the coalition and (ii) the sharing rule. In
general, we should consider also the way in which coalitions interact, but in
our model this is pinned down by the assumption of Cournot competition.
We decided to use a cooperative concept of stability: the equilibrium
binding agreement (EBA) introduced by Ray and Vohra [1997]. A coalition
structure is stable if it can be supported by an EBA. Equilibrium Binding
Agreements are strategy profiles that are immune to coalition deviations
which (i) are consistent (no further deviation) and (ii) can be supported by
the external players, i.e. the deviation is profitable considering the optimal
reply of the remaining players. One important feature of this concept is
that coalitions can only break up in smaller coalitions as a consequence of
a deviation10. Note that, when a player decides whether to deviate he will
consider all the possible reactions of both, the subset of deviating players
and the players who have not deviated, until a stable coalition structure is
reached. An synthetic formal definition of this concept is provided by Yi and
Shin [1995]:
“a nondegenerate coalition structure P = {n1, n2, . . . , nm} is sta-
ble under the Equilibrium Binding Agreement rule if and only if
there do not exist P1 = {n11, n12, . . . , n1m(1)}, P2 = {n21, n22, . . . , n2m(2)},
. . ., PR = {nR1 , nR2 , . . . , nRm(R)} such that
(1) P1 = P and Pr+1 = Pr \ {nri(r)}
⋃{nˆri(r), nri(r) − nˆri(r)}, for
10As stated by Muthoo [2004], it is implicit the idea that breaking up a coalition is
costless comparing to forming a new coalition.
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some i(r) = 1, . . . ,m(r) and for all r = 1, . . . , R− 1;
(2) Pr is stable but P2,P3, . . . ,PR−1 are not; and
(3) nˆ1i(1) leading perpetrators are better off under the final coali-
tion structure PR than under the original coalition structure
P = P1.
The application of this concept usually produces more than one stable
coalition structure. In order to compute the equilibrium of the game, we
assume the most concentrated11 stable coalition structure as the equilibrium
of the coalition formation stage.
In games with transferable utility, the stability of a coalition structure
ultimately depends on the sharing rule adopted. Assuming an exogenous
sharing rule allows to represent the gain from cooperation inside a coalition
as a valuation which maps coalition structures into vectors of individual
payoffs12 Ray and Vohra [1999] show that, in an infinite-horizon model of
coalition formation with symmetric players, the “equal” sharing rule results
as the outcome of any equilibrium without delay. In fact, in our model
players (firms) are symmetric ex-ante (prior of the action choice) but they can
be asymmetric ex-post. We acknowledge the importance of an appropriate
sharing rule, and we postpone a detailed discussion to section four. The
assumption of an equal sharing rule does not seem to be appropriate in our
11We use the Yi and Shin [1995]’s concept of concentration as reported in Bloch [2003]:
“A coalition structure P = {n1, n2, . . . , nm} is a concentration of a coalition structure
P ′ = {n′1, n′2, . . . , n′m} if there exist two subcoalition structures, D and D′ of P and
P ′, D = {k1, k2, . . . , ks} with k1 ≥ k2 ≥ . . . ≥ ks and D′ = {k′1, k′2, . . . , k′s+t} with
k′1 ≥ k′2 ≥ . . . ≥ k′s+t such that (i) P \ D = P ′ \ D′ and (ii)
∑j
i=1 ki >
∑j
i=1 k
′
i for all
j = 1, 2, . . . , s ”.
12See Bloch [1996] for a discussion on the sensibility of this assumption.
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case, nevertheless we start by assuming the equal sharing rule in order to
compare our model with the results in Ray and Vohra [1997] and Bloch
[1996]; furthermore, there might be some institutional scenarios in which
such a rule is imposed. For instance, when “fairness” is the main concern; or
we can think of a situation in which players decide, prior to any action, to
commit to a particular sharing rule, and since they are symmetric the equal
sharing rule seems to be a plausible choice.
3 A reduced form model: symmetry and Equal
Sharing Rule
In this section we consider a reduced form of the model, in which the
investment decision is exogenously given. In particular, we assume that all
firms have acquired the asset. This assumption makes all firms identical
in the coalition game, so that the assumption of an equal sharing rule is
justifiable. Hence we can compare the results we obtain with the existing
literature on coalition market structure.
We consider a coalition game in which an equal sharing rule is exogenously
imposed. We call this game Γˆ.
Assumption D’ Equal Sharing Rule The worth of each coalition
is shared in equal parts among its members.
We characterized in the previous section the Cournot game that coalitions
play in the third stage. Now we characterize the stable coalition structure
given the investment decision of each firm at date 1.
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In order to contrast our results with the existing literature on oligopoly
and coalitions we consider the symmetric case x1 = x2 = x3 = 1, in which
each firm acquires the asset. Most of the models of coalition formation in
oligopoly assume symmetric firms, and no synergy in merging (i.e. the cost
of the resulting firm is the same as the cost of the merging firms). Here we
want to introduce a certain degree of synergy, by assuming that all firms
have acquired the cost reducing investment, so that the resulting firm has a
lower cost than the merging firms. In the following we assume α = 1, this
is without loss of generality, because our aim is to compare our model with
models in which α = 0.
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit Tot Profit
P1 {1, 2, 3} c = C0 − 3 p¯i = (A+3)212b Π = (A+3)
2
4b
P2 {1, 2}{3} c1 = C0 − 2 c2 = C0 − 1 pi′′ = (A+3)218b pi′ = A
2
9b
Π = 2A
2+6A+9
9b
P3 {1}{2}{3} c∗ = C0 − 1 pi∗ = (A+1)216b Π = 3(A+1)
2
16b
Let A = (a−C0) be the difference between the demand size and the cost
structure of the industry. As we will see this relation plays an important
role for the stability of a coalition structure. Since firms are symmetric we
did not report the case of coalitions of firm 2 with firm 3 and firm 1 with
firm 3, these two coalition strucutres would be the same as the coalition
structure P2. In the above table, p¯i represents the per capita worth of the
grand coalition, while pi∗ is the per capita worth of the singleton coalitions;
pi′′ is the per capita worth of a coalition with two firms, while pi′ is the per
capita worth of a coalition with only one firm.
Lemma 1 In case of bilateral deviation from the grand coalition the per
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capita payoff they get as a result of the deviation, is always lower than their
payoff in the grand coalition, i.e. pi′′ < pi.
Proof. The proof of this and the following two lemmas, is straightfor-
ward, we just need to compare the per-capita payoff in different coalitions
and check which one prevails.
Lemma 2 The payoff of a single firm deviating from the grand coalition, in
case the other firms remain in the original coalition, is greater than his/her
payoff in the grand coalition if and only if A ≥ 19.39.
Note that in Ray and Vohra [1997] this lemma is always satisfied, does
not depend on the value of A. This point will be clarified later.
Lemma 3 The singleton profit is lower than the per capita profit of any
deviation from the grand coalition, i.e. pi∗ ≤ pi′′, if and only if A ≤ 31.97.
In this case, firms who are left in a two member coalition have no incentive
to separate only if A > 31.97.
Now, considering the three lemmas we can get the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the coalition game Γˆ(x = 1) with demand P = a−bQ and
marginal cost cs = C0−
∑
i∈s xi, for A ≡ (a−C0) such that 19.38 ≤ A ≤ 31.97
the grand coalition is blocked by the stable coalition structure {i, j}{k}.
Proof. The structure of the proof relies on 4 separate remarks. Firstly,
the singleton payoff is never greater than the per capita grand coalition pay-
off. Secondly, the per capita payoff of the two-firm coalition in P2 is always
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lower than the per capita payoff of the grand coalition. Given this two re-
marks, we need to check only for incentives to unilaterally deviate from the
grand coalition. Thirdly, the incentive to unilaterally deviate of each firm
depends on how the other two firms will react. Finally, in coalition structure
P2 members of the two-firm coalition will stick together if A ≤ 31.97. By
simple comparison of per capita payoff we have that unilateral deviation is
profitable only for 19.39 ≤ A ≤ 31.97. If A > 31.97 one firm would like to
deviate, but he knows that in this case the other two firms will split and all
of them will end up in the singleton coalition structure which gives a lower
payoff than P1. When A < 11.39 there is no incentive to unilaterally deviate.
Even if the other two firms will stick together, the payoff of the lonely firm
in coalition P2 is lower than in the grand coalition.
In contrast to Ray and Vohra [1997], the grand coalition is not stable.
The intuition for this result relies on the effect each firm has on the marginal
cost of the coalition, and, hence, on the share of profits that the coalition can
capture. In Ray and Vohra [1997] as well as in Bloch [1996], what matters
is only the number of coalitions not their size (the number of firms in each
coalition). Notice that the game Γˆ(x = 1) is analogous to the coalition game
in Ray and Vohra [1997]: it is a Transferable Utility symmetric game with
positive externalities. The difference is in the marginal cost which is not
fixed across coalitions but depends on the number of members.
We can identify two effects driving the incentive to join a coalition:
B competition externality (Stigler effect) firms which do not partici-
pate in a merger (coalition) can benefit more than firms involved in
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the merger13. It depends on the change in the number of coalitions
competing in the market;
B efficiency effect (synergy effect) a firm leaving a coalition modifies
the worth of all coalitions because of his/her impact on the marginal
cost of the coalition he leaves and the coalition he joins (this effect is
present even if the number of coalitions in the market does not change)
The first effect is present in all models of coalitions with positive externalities,
and, in case of Cournot competition, it gives an incentive for a firm to exit
a coalition. The second effect is driven by the possibility of a firm to reduce
the marginal cost of a coalition. In this case, deviating to form a singleton
might not be convenient, because the deviating firm needs to weight the
benefit of not sharing the coalition worth, with a lower share of the total
worth, as a result of a higher marginal cost. Which one of the two effects
prevails depends on the size of demand and the underling cost structure of the
industry, C0. Here comes the importance of A for the equilibrium structure
14
. We showed that the grand coalition is stable only for a certain range of
values of A, while in Ray and Vohra [1997] the grand coalition, with only
three firms, is always stable. The parameter A can be interpreted as a proxy
of the importance of the cost structure relative to the demand size in the
formation of the per capita profit. In fact, when A is large, meaning that
the cost is a negligible part of the profits, the competition effects prevails –
13This concept was proposed by Stigler [1950].
14Also Espinosa and Macho-Stadler [2003] in a model of coalition formation with moral
hazard highlight the role of the ratio between demand size and structure of costs. Their
model, indeed, is similar to ours in the fact that partners of the coalition simultaneously
decide the effort in reducing the marginal cost of the coalition. Therefore, the per capita
payoff does not depend just on the number of coalitions in the market.
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a firm is willing to have a higher marginal cost and exploit the high demand
on his own. When A is small, costs are an important component of firms’
profit and the efficiency effects prevail, so that firms are not willing to incur
higher costs by deviating. So, for small values of A, the grand coalition is
stable because the efficiency effect prevails, for large values of A the grand
coalition is stable as well because the competition effect is so strong that
when one firm deviates the coalition disintegrates in singletons. However, for
intermediate values of A, the two forces balance and the grand coalition is
not stable. To sum up, the main difference with models of cartel formation
is the introduction of an element of synergy among firm’s members which
makes it more difficult to leave the grand coalition.
In the appendix we present the whole model15 with the “equal” sharing
rule. We show that for intermediate values of A, the following proposition
applies:
Proposition 2 The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game Γˆ(x) is given
by the following strategy profile:
B for φ < 3.45 =⇒ at date 1, two firms invest (i=1, j=1, k=0), at date
2, the grand coalition {i,j,k} forms;
B for 3.45 < φ < 3.55 =⇒ there are two equilibria:
(i) at date 1, only one firm invests (i=0, j=1, k=0), at date 2, the
grand coalition ({i,j,k}) forms;
(ii) at date 1, nobody invests (i=0, j=0, k=0), at date 2, the grand
coalition ({i,j,k}) forms;
15We endogenize the investment decision
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B for φ > 3.75 =⇒ at date 1, nobody invests (i=0, j=0, k=0), at date 2
the grand coalition ({i,j,k}) forms.
Notice that the situation in which all firms acquire the asset is never
sustained as an equilibrium. We will discuss more in detail this result at the
end of the section. Now, we turn to our main model, where the decision to
invest is endogenous, and we propose a different sharing rule to take into
account the potential asymmetry among firms.
4 The model with a Weighted Sharing Rule
We propose the full model, where the investment decision is endogenous.
In this case firms can by asymmetric in the coalition game, it seems more
natural to devise a mechanism that assigns to each member a share of the
worth as a function of his/her “importance” in the coalition. We start by
making some general remarks about sharing the worth of a coalition.
The literature on coalition games in characteristic function16, considers
two main conditions that an imputation, i.e. a sharing rule, should satisfy:
• individual rationality;
• group rationality.
Let pii be the individual payoff of firm i and pi
∗ her payoff by acting
non cooperatively, i.e. singleton coalition. Individual rationality implies
that a player must be guaranteed a payoff not lower than the payoff he/she
can obtain by acting non cooperatively, i.e. pii ≥ pi∗. Group rationality
16Remember that the characteristic function approach does not allow for externalities
among coalitions. See for a good reference Friedman [1989].
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guarantees that there is no other agreement that gives all, or some of the
players, a higher payoff without decreasing the payoff of somebody else. This
is basically a version of Pareto efficiency,
∑
i∈N pii = v(N). In our model
the application of these two principles are not immediate. As concerns the
individual rationality, the payoff a player can obtain, staying alone, depends
on the whole coalition structure, while the group rationality seems to be
tailored just for the grand coalition.
An important and widely used sharing rule is the Shapley Value. The
Shapley value satisfies the following axioms:
(i) Group Rationality
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N);
(ii) Contribution: if player i adds v({i}) in any coalition the he/she should
receive v({i});
(iii) Symmetry: if two games differ only for the order of players, then the
Shaply value is the same in both games;
(iv) Linearity: given a game Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 the Shapley value is the sum of
the Shapley value in each of the two separate games.
The per capita payoff depends on the contribution a player makes to each
coalition of which he can be a member. This is very important when players
are asymmetric. However, since the Shapley value assumes the stability of
the grand coalition, if we apply it to coalition structures where the grand
coalition fails to form the problem is again how to treat the externalities
among coalitions.
We propose the following properties a sharing rule should satisfy in coali-
tion games in partition function with asymmetric players:
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(a) Identical players should obtain the same share of worth;
(b) Contribution: the share of each player should be a function of his/her
“contribution” to the coalition he/she is a member;
(c) Efficiency (Group Rationality), a sharing rule should distribute all the
worth of a coalition structure – the difference with the usual group
rationality condition is that we require it to be valid within and for
each possible coalition structure;
Note that we do not require the individual rationality principle to neces-
sarily apply. This is because we allow for a more general set up in which a
player can actually gain from staying alone.
Condition (b) is particularly important because we can have several shar-
ing rules according to the stability concept we adopt. What happens when
a player deviates? Can he form another coalition or not? What happens to
the players in a coalition after a deviation? Do they remain together or they
split? Can they form other coalitions? These are all important question that
require a very careful analysis.
We propose the following mechanism, in which the “contribution” of a
player is determined according to her stable outside option. Before describing
the mechanism, we need to define an “ordered” set of coalitions:
Definition 1 (Ordered coalition structure) Let Ck be a subset of parti-
tions, where the largest coalition has exactly k members.
We are now ready to define our sharing rule.
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[Weighted Sharing Rule] Let s be a coalition in P ′, with |s| =
k members. Let us order coalition structures so that P ′ ∈ Ck.
The contribution of player j ∈ s is defined as the difference v(s)−
v(s−j) if s−j is stable, where s−j represents coalition s without
player j. If s−j is not stable, define Pˆ as the stable coalition
structure determined with the players in s−j and sˆ the coalitions
in partition Pˆ , then v(s−j) =
∑
sˆ v(sˆ). The share of player j is
given as the weighted sum of the contributions of all players in s.
This procedure is reiterated for any Ck starting from C2 up to Cn.
This procedure is based on Ray and Vohra [1997] restriction on the pos-
sibility of forming coalitions: coalitions can only split in smaller coalitions.
It works also for multiple deviations. The next example helps to clarify this
concept. Notice that in case of identical players our sharing rule is equivalent
to the “equal” sharing rule.
4.1 Example
Consider three players i = 1, 2, 3. We have five possible coalition structures
P . We order this coalition structures according to the number of players in
the largest coalition in each P . Let Ck be the set of coalition with identical
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order. In case of 3 players, we would have
C3 ={1, 2, 3}
C2 ={1, 2}{3}
{1, 3}{2}
{2, 3}{1}
C1 ={1}{2}{3}
Notice that the number of coalition structure in each Ck represents the com-
bination of n elements in groups of size k, i.e. c(n, k). So, the number of
coalition structures in C2 ≡ c(3, 2) = 3.
Coalitions in C1 are stable by definition and the worth of a coalition repre-
sents also the per capita payoff. Coalition structures in C2 are characterized
by one singleton and one coalition with two players17. Let us focus on the
division of surplus of the following coalitions:
{1, 2} {3}
{1, 3} {2}
{3, 2} {1}
Take the first line. The payoff of player 3 is trivially the worth of his singleton
coalition, while for {1,2} the marginal “contribution” of player 1 and 2 are
17In general, for n > 3, C2 would be characterized by a series of singletons and the
two-member coalitions.
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w1 and w2, respectively,
w1 = v({1, 2})− v({2})
w2 = v({1, 2})− v({1})
These two conditions represent their stable outside option, because the sin-
gleton coalition is stable by definition. The share of worth for player 1 and
2 would be ω1 and ω2,
ω1 = v({1, 2})
(
w1
w1 + w2
)
ω2 = v({1, 2})
(
w2
w1 + w2
)
In this way we can compute the per capita payoff of each coalition struc-
ture in C2.
Then we move up to C3, i.e. the grand coalition {1,2,3}. We repeat the
same procedure, being careful to check the stability of the outside option.
For instance, when checking player 1 contribution we need to consider the
worth of {2,3} if stable, otherwise we consider v({2}) + v({3}). Note that
when we check the stability of coalition {2,3} we consider the per capita
payoff computed in C2.
4.2 Coalition formation game
Our aim in this section is to investigate the merging behavior of firms as
a function of the acquisition of the asset. This would depend on the value
of α the marginal cost-saving impact. In order to make the model more
24
tractable we specify a value for A = 20, which represents an intermediate
level as defined in the previous section. In particular we set the demand
function equal to P = 30 − Q and the marginal cost function equal to cs =
10 − α∑i∈s xi. In order to have “active” firms in the market we need to
impose the condition α ≤ 10P
i∈s xi
. Since the sharing rule corresponds to an
equal sharing rule in case of identical firms, the distribution of payoffs where
either all firms invest or no firm invests is the same as in the case of equal
sharing rule. Firstly, we present all possible investment scenarios and we
compute the stable coalition structure in each of them, then we investigate
the investment decision of each firm in the first stage.
All Investment ⇒ x1 = x2 = x3 = 1
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c¯ = 10− 3α p¯i = (20+3α)212
P2 {1,2} {3} c12 = 10− 2α c3 = 10− α pi1 = pi2 = (20+3α)218
pi3 =
400
9
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c∗ = 10− α pi∗ = (20+α)2
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The stability of each coalition structure depends on the value of α, the
marginal impact of the asset on the cost function.
Proposition 3 (All Invest) The grand coalition is blocked by coalition struc-
ture P2 in case, 0.626 ≤ α ≤ 1.031; otherwise the grand coalition is stable.
For a small impact of the asset on the cost function of the coalition, firms
prefer to merge. In other words, it is not convenient for a firm to exit the
grand coalition. However, as the impact increases, the grand coalition is
blocked by P2. Two firms find it convenient to merge, and the third one can
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“free ride” on them. From this point of view the presence of the cost-reducing
asset blocks the grand coalition.
When the impact is very large, the grand coalition becomes stable again
because the synergy of the assets more than compensate the “Stigler” effect.
No Investment ⇒ x1 = x2 = x3 = 0
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c¯ = 10 pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = A212
P2 {1,2} {3} c12 = c3 = 10 pi1 = pi2 = A218 pi3 = A
2
9
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c∗ = 10 pi∗ = A2
16
The grand coalition is always stable. This is in line with the literature
on coalition formation and oligopoly with identical firms. Since there is no
synergy effect, a merger of two firms is never convenient. Hence, in order
to avoid competition (coalition structure P∗), they prefer to merge in a big
monopoly firm.
ONE Investor ⇒ x1 = 1 x2 = x3 = 0
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c¯ = 10− α pi1 = v¯ω¯1 pi2 = pi3 = v¯ω¯2
P2 {1,2} {3} c12 = 10− α c3 = 10 pi1 = vω1 pi2 = vω2 pi3 = (20−α)29
P3 {1} {2,3} c1 = 10− α c23 = 10 pi1 = (20+2α)29 pi2 = pi3 = (20−α)
2
18
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c1 = 10− α c2 = c3 = 10 pi1 = (20+3α)216 pi2 = pi3 = (20−α)
2
16
Firstly notice that the coalition structure ({1, 3} {2}) is analogous in
terms of payoffs to coalition structure P2, hence we have omitted it. In
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the table the profit of the grand coalition is represented by
v¯ =
[
20 + α
2
]2
while the profit of the two-firm coalition in P2 is
v =
[
20 + 2α
3
]2
The weights associated with the per capita payoff are:
ω¯1 =
[
1200 + 3α2 + 200α
3600− 7α2 + 280α
]
ω¯2 =
[
1200− 5α2 + 40α
3600− 7α2 + 280α
]
ω1 =
[
2800 + 55α2 + 1640α
5600 + 92α2 + 1840α
]
ω2 =
[
2800 + 97α2 + 200α
5600 + 92α2 + 1840α
]
Before any consideration on the stability of the coalition structure, notice
that the worth of coalition {1, 2} in P2 and coalition {1} in P3 are the
same, i.e. firm 2 apparently does not bring anything to the new coalition.
However, we cannot conclude that her marginal contribution is nil. What
firm 2 actually brings, by merging with firm 1, is a reduction of competition
in the market, and this is a benefit for firm 1 (and for firm 3 as well). The
weighted sharing rule does take into account this aspect.
The second thing to notice is the effect of the Asset on the strategy
of firm 1. Let us consider coalition {1, 2} in P2. The incentive of firm 1 to
deviate increases with α the marginal impact of the asset on the cost function.
With α = 0, the coalition is stable, while with α = 1 this coalition is not
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stable. This consideration has an effect on the distribution of the worth in
the coalition, the relative share of the firm with the asset, in our case firm 1,
increases with α.
Proposition 4 (One invests) The grand coalition is stable for α ≤ 4, the
singleton coalition is the only stable coalition structure for α > 4.
Proof. In the appendix.
To understand this point notice that the share of profit that goes to the
firm which owns the asset increases with the marginal impact, α. When the
marginal impact of the asset is α < 4, firm 1 (the firm with the asset) has no
incentive to block the grand coalition. In other words, it is not convenient
to form a two-firm coalition, firm 1 is willing to merge only in the grand
coalition. Conversely, the other firms in the grand coalition have no incentive
to deviate, because they know they will end up in a very competitive market,
i.e. P∗.
When the impact of the asset is larger, α > 4, firm 1 (the owner of the
asset) has no interest to merge with anybody, the benefit it would receive in
terms of lower competition does not compensate the profit it has to give up
after merging. In other words, the Stigler effect prevails because no reduction
in costs would result from merging. Hence, what leads firm 1 to merge is
to enjoy monopoly power, and only in case of a grand coalition this aspect
prevail on the “Stigler” effect.
TWO Investors ⇒ x1 = 1 x2 = 1x3 = 0
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Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c = 10− 2α pi1 = ω¯1 pi2 = ω¯2 pi3 = ω¯3
P2 {1,2} {3} c12 = 10− 2α c3 = 10 pi1 = pi2 = (20+4α)218 pi3 = (20−2α)
2
9
P3 {1,3} {2} c13 = 10− α c2 = 10− α pi1 = ω1 pi3 = ω2 pi2 = (20+α)29
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c1 = c2 = 10− α c3 = 10 pi1 = pi2 = (20+2α)216 pi3 = (20−2α)
2
16
In the table, the value of the payoffs labelled ω are given by the following
expressions:
ω¯1 = ω¯2 =
(α+ 10)2(α2 + 40α+ 100)
3α2 + 100α+ 300
ω¯3 =
(α+ 10)4
3α2 + 100α+ 300
ω1 =
(α+ 2)(α− 70)(α+ 20)2
18(α2 − 32α− 140) ω3 =
(α− 10)(α+ 14)(α+ 20)2
18(α2 − 32α− 140)
Coalition P3 stability depends on the value of α. Both firms18 in coalition
{1, 3} would deviate only for α ≤ 1.43. We see that also in this case the
investment, i.e. the acquisition of the asset, plays a positive role on the
stability of a coalition. When the impact of the cost-saving asset is large
coalition structure P3 is stable.
Coalition structure P2 stability follows the same driving forces. In par-
ticular, for α > 0.65, P2 is stable, while for α < 0.65 is not stable. Notice
that as the effect of the asset tends to zero, we go back to the case of no in-
vestment, where coalition structure P2 is analogous to P3. This is the reason
why, for α ≤ 0.65 both coalition structures are not stable.
Let us focus on the stability of the grand coalition. For α ≤ 0.65 both
P2 and P3 are not stable. In this case, all three firms have an incentive to
18Actually the discriminant value for firm 1 is about 1.42, and for firm 3 is about 1.43.
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merge and form a grand coalition. For 0.65 < α ≤ 1.43, coalition structure
P2 is stable, and it blocks the grand coalition. The two firms with the asset
find it profitable to merge even without the other firm. In other words,
the firm with no asset has an incentive to deviate from the grand coalition
because the other two will remain together. It seems that the asset is a
burden for these two firms, if they had no asset the grand coalition would
form. The last possibility is a very strong impact of the asset. If α > 1.43
both coalition P2 and P3 are stable, and both can block the grand coalition.
Any market structure in which two firms merge is stable, regardless of the
asset ownership.
Proposition 5 (two invest) In case only two firms acquire the asset, the
grand coalition is stable for α ≤ 0.65; a market structure in which the two
firms with the asset merge, is stable for 0.65 < α ≤ 1.43; and finally, a
market structure with any two firms merging is stable for α > 1.43.
This proposition is clearly driven by the impact of the asset on the cost
function. As α increases the possibility to have a monopoly market structure
decreases.
4.3 Investment decision
We now consider the first stage of the game, where firms simultaneously
decide whether to invest. In the table 1 we present a summary of stable
coalition structures in each investment scenario.
For the case of two investments, the first line refers to the fact that a
coalition in which any two firms merge is stable, while the second line refers
30
Table 1: Summary of stable coalition structures
Investment decision Stable Coalition Structure Condition on α
All invest {i,j} {k} 0.626 < α ≤ 1.031
{i,j,k} otherwise
No investment {i,j,k} for all α
ONE invests xi = 1 {i} {j} {k} α > 4
{i,j,k} α ≤ 4
TWO invest x1 = x2 = 1 {i,j} {k} α > 1.43
{1,2} {3} 0.65 < α ≤ 1.43
{i,j,k} α ≤ 0.65
to the fact that only coalitions in which the two firms who have invested
merge is stable. The main difference with the outcome of the “equal” sharing
rule, relates to the two asymmetric situations.
Let us compute the SPE for α = 1. This is the case in which the asset
has a moderate impact on the cost function. Actually the SPE we find is
valid for all cases in which 0.65 < α ≤ 1.031.
Given the cost of investment φ, we have the following SPE,
Proposition 6 The Subgame Perfect equilibrium of the game depends on
the cost of investment φ,
B if φ < 7.85, at date 1 only one firm invests, at date 2 the grand coalition
forms;
B if φ > 7.85, at date 1 nobody invests, at date 2 the grand coalition
forms.
Proof. The proof of the SPE relies on showing that the strategy de-
scribed is a Nash equilibrium in any subgame. We have three subgames.
We proceeded by backward induction to compute the equilibrium in the
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Cournot game, then the equilibrium in the coalition formation game, and
now we should show the equilibrium of the simultaneous investment game.
Let us define the profit of each firm as pii; the stable coalition structure as
P∗(x), which depends on the action chosen by the three firms; and finally,
the sharing rule which allows to link the coalition structure to the individual
payoff, v(x). The problem faced by each firm i at date 1 is
maxxi pii(xj, xk, φ)
s.t. pii ∈ v : P ∗ (x)→ Rn
We obtain a system of 3 first order conditions to solve for the three variables
xi, xj, xk. This solution would depend on the cost of the investment φ. Note
that we are assuming that α = 1, therefore we have a specific payoff for any
equilibrium structure. The equilibrium is given by the optimal strategy of
each firm given the strategy of the other two firms. This would be a standard
game in strategic form with perfect and complete information, so the proof
of our result follows the standard proof of an SPE in such a game.
A corollary of this equilibrium is that a firm with an asset is willing to
share it with inefficient firms only if a monopoly is created.
The main policy implication of our result is that when the investment
decision is endogenous, even for a low cost of the asset, i.e. low φ, a situation
in which all firms acquire the asset is never sustained as an equilibrium. The
reason, as noted before, lies in the instability of the grand coalition, because
the threat to go to a singleton competition structure is not credible if they
all have acquired the asset. Hence, firms could avoid to acquire the asset in
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order to keep the credible threat of singleton competition.
It is common wisdom that a certain degree of monopoly power is necessary
for a firm to grow and become more efficient. Our model, however, shows
that this is not always true. Even if the equilibrium is characterized by a
monopoly market structure, only one firm acquires the cost-reducing asset.
We believe19 that only when the impact of the asset is very large, we may
have an equilibrium characterized by monopoly and full efficiency (all firms
acquire the asset). When all firms acquire the asset, the grand coalition is
stable, i.e. the synergy prevails on the “Stigler” effect. On the other side,
when the synergy effect is very small, the grand coalition is still stable, but for
a different reason: when one player deviates the other two have no incentive
to stick together because of the low synergy effect, and they end up in the
singleton coalition; this would prevent each player from deviating.
A comparison between the equilibrium under the “equal” and the “weighted”
sharing rule, shows that with the latter the cost level at which investing is
not convenient for anybody is higher, from 3.75 to 7.85. However, with the
“weighted” sharing rule there is no possibility of having more than one firm
to invest. An intuitive argument for this result would be that the “weighted”
rule while giving an higher return for the investment, hinders the stability of
the grand coalition when two firms invest, so that the higher return can be
enjoyed only when one firm invests.
19We have not formally shown this point. We leave this for future research.
33
5 Social Welfare and Policy implications
The welfare theory tells us that the maximum social welfare is achieved
in perfect competition. We should, therefore, avoid monopoly structures.
However, as shown in Motta [2004], the trade-off between number of firms in a
market and welfare is not so clear. From a “static” point of view, the presence
of economies of scale may offset the negative impact of monopolies on social
welfare. For instance, in a market characterized by high fixed costs, the
presence of many small firms does not allow to exploit the economies of scale.
From a “dynamic” point of view the possibility to enjoy monopoly power
provides the incentives to invest. In our model both issues are considered.
It seems that firms have two ways in which they can increase their monopoly
power:
(a) Investing in a cost-saving asset, in order to become more efficient than
the other firms, and gain a larger share of the market;
(b) merging with other firms.
These two strategies are not necessarily substitutes. It might be that
firms both invest and decide to merge. Our model, however, shows that the
two strategies have a certain degree of complementarity. In equilibrium, they
all merge but only one firm invests.
In our model, however, we need to take into account the increase in
efficiency resulting from the merging behavior of firms. The key point is how
much of this efficiency gain is passed on to consumers. Notice, however, that
the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium we obtain is characterized by monopoly
market structure where at maximum one firm invests. This situation cannot
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be Pareto superior to a monopoly market structure in which more than one
firm invests.
Furthermore, our model seems to suggest that in order to increase social
welfare a government policy should be directed towards restrictions on the
possibility to merge more than subsidizing investments. The latter policy
has no effect in equilibrium, because even if the government reduces the cost
of the investment, only one firm invests.
We leave for future research the analysis of the effect on the equilibrium
of an anti-trust law that may reduce the possibility to merge. Intuitively,
once the grand coalition is blocked by law, other equilibria may emerge in
which more than one firm acquires the asset.
6 Concluding comments
We presented a model of mergers and acquisitions in which the investment
decision of each firm is endogenous. The result we obtain in this case is
that in equilibrium, under some conditions, only one firm invest and they
all decide to merge in a monopolistic firm. The results are mainly driven by
the interaction of two forces: the Stiglitz effect, and the synergy effect. The
interaction of these two forces is captured by the demand parameter A and
the marginal impact of the cost reducing investment α. We characterized
the equilibrium for an intermediate range of these values, in which there is
no force which prevails on the other.
The equilibrium we obtained is characterized by a monopoly structure
(the three firms merge), while at most one firm invests. It is interesting to
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note that even if the cost of the investment tends to zero still only one firm
invests.
This result seems to suggest that subsidizing firms does not provide any
further incentive to invest. More effective would be an anti-trust law which
forbids the formation of a monopoly market structure.
The policy implication should be weighted with the restrictions we have
imposed in our model, mainly the presence of only three firms with no pos-
sibility for new firms to enter.
We leave for future research the extension of the model to more than
three firms and the analysis of different way in which the investment affects
the efficiency of the coalition.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we present the full model under two different sharing rules: the
equal sharing rule and the weighted sharing rule.
A.1 Equal sharing rule: Example 1
We present a game in which the grand coalition does not form when all firms
invest. We now consider and example which satisfies proposition 1, i.e. the two
effects balance 19.38 ≤ A ≤ 31.97. In appendix A.2 we present an example in
which the competition effect prevails and, therefore, the grand coalition is stable,
as in Ray and Vohra [1997] and Bloch [1996]. Let us consider the following demand
and marginal cost functions
P = 30−Q
cs = 10−
∑
i∈s
xi
where pi represents per member payoff, while Π represents total payoff (industry
profit). In this example, the marginal effect of the investment is α = 1.
Everybody invests ⇒ xi = 1∀ i
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit Tot Profit
P1 {1, 2, 3} c = 7 p¯i = 44.083¯ Π = 123.25
P2 {1,2} {3} c1 = 8 c2 = 9 pi′′ = 29.38¯ pi′ = 44.4¯ Π = 103.2¯
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c∗ = 9 pi∗ = 27.5625 Π = 82.6875
The grand coalition fails to form. This is important because the first best is
not achieved. Since firms are symmetric it does not matter who is in the coalition
of two firms, once one of the three firms decides to deviate the other two cannot
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do better than stick together. It would be more appropriate to say that the stable
coalition structure is any permutation20 of the structure [{1,2} {3}].
20In combinatory calculus, this is actually a combination of 3 firms, two at a time,
c(3, 2).
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No investment ⇒ xi = 0∀ i
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit Tot Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c = 10 p¯i = 33.3¯ Π = 100
P2 {1,2} {3} c1 = c2 = 10 pi′′ = 22.2¯ pi′ = 44.4¯ Π = 88.8¯
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c∗ = 10 pi∗ = 25 Π = 75
This is the same as in Ray and Vohra [1997], with three firms the grand coalition
is stable.
ONE Investor ⇒ x1 = 1 x2 = x3 = 0
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit Tot Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c = 9 p¯i = 36.75 Π = 110.25
P2 {1,2} {3} c1 = 9 c2 = 10 pi′′ = 26.8¯ pi′ = 40.1¯ Π = 93.8¯
P3 {1} {2,3} c1 = 9 c2 = 9 pi′ = 53.7¯ pi′′ = 20.05¯ Π = 93.8¯
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c1 = 9 c2 = c3 = 10 pi1 = 33.0625 pi2 = pi3 = 22.5625 Π = 78.1875
Players are no longer symmetric, so coalition structure P2 is different than
coalition structure P3. The grand coalition is stable, even if one firm makes a
cost-saving investment. That means firm 2 and firm 3 can free ride on firm 1.
TWO Investors ⇒ x1 = x2 = 1 x3 = 0
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit Tot Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c = 8 p¯i = 40.3¯ Π = 121
P2 {1,2} {3} c1 = 8 c2 = 10 pi′′ = 32 pi′ = 36 Π = 100
P3 {1} {2,3} c1 = 9 c2 = 9 pi′ = 49 pi′′ = 24.5 Π = 98
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c1 = c2 = 9 c3 = 10 pi1 = pi2 = 30.25 pi3 = 20.25 Π = 80.75
Also in this case the grand coalition is stable, and firm 3 can free ride on the other
two firms.
In this simple example two things are worth noticing,
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1. the grand coalition fails to form when everybody invests,
2. the grand coalition forms even if (and only if) some firms free ride.
The stability of the grand coalition depends on the investment decision and
not only on the Cournot competition game. With only three firms we may or may
not have a stable grand coalition, depending on the investment decision of firms
at stage 1.
We now turn to check the incentives to invest of the three firms given the
outcome of the coalition formation game. Remember that the cost of investment
is the same for everybody and equal to φ. The following table summarizes the
payoff of each firm in every possible investment scenario of the game.
Investment decision Stable Coalition Structure Individual payoff
All invest {i,j} {k} (29.38¯) (44.4¯)
No investment {i,j,k} 33.3¯
ONE invests xi = 1 {i,j,k} 36.75
TWO invest xi = xj = 1 {i,j,k} 40.3¯
Remember that firms are ex-ante symmetric and that they simultaneously
make the investment decision. The SPE depends on the level of the investment
cost φ.
Proposition 7 The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game Γˆ(x) is given by
the following strategy profile:
B for φ < 3.45 =⇒ at date 1, two firms invest (i=1, j=1, k=0), at date 2, the
grand coalition {i,j,k} forms;
B for 3.45 < φ < 3.55 =⇒ there are two equilibria:
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(i) at date 1, only one firm invests (i=0, j=1, k=0), at date 2, the grand
coalition ({i,j,k}) forms;
(ii) at date 1, nobody invests (i=0, j=0, k=0), at date 2, the grand coalition
({i,j,k}) forms;
B for φ > 3.75 =⇒ at date 1, nobody invests (i=0, j=0, k=0), at date 2 the
grand coalition ({i,j,k}) forms.
Proof. To prove that this is a strategy profile which sustains a SPE, we
need to check that in each stage the strategy profile implies a Nash equilibrium
of the simultaneous stage game. Note, however, that in the second stage we use
the concept of stable coalition structure, instead of the Nash equilibrium. The
equilibrium in the second and third stage was showed before. Here we focus on
the equilibrium in the first stage given the equilibrium in the other two stages.
This is a Nash equilibrium of a complete and perfect information game, so we
omit the formal proof.
In equilibrium either nobody invests or at least one firm free rides, but the
grand coalition always forms. Even if we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of the
equilibrium for any level of φ, we have a unique SPE for large and small investment
cost. Large investment costs intuitively discourage firms to invest.
Remark 2 In case everybody invests, the grand coalition fails to form. Only if at
least one firm does not invest the grand coalition forms. So, the grand coalition
may fail to form even with only 3 firms, while in Ray and Vohra [1997], for the
grand coalition to fail a large number of firms is needed, n > 4.
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A.2 Equal sharing rule: Exercise 2
This exercise shows that, when the demand is quite small compared to the cost
structure, the efficiency effect prevails on the competition effect. We consider
A < 19.38. Let us consider the following demand and marginal cost functions:
P = 10−Q
cs = 4−
∑
i∈s
xi
Symmetric investment: x1 = x2 = x3 = 1
Coalition Structure MC Profit per capita Total profit
{1,2,3} c = 1 pi = 6.75 20.25
{1,2} {3} c1 = 2 c2 = 3 pi1 = 4.5 pi2 = 4 13
{1} {2} {3} c1 = c2 = c3 = 3 pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 3.06 9.18
The stable solution is the grand coalition. In this case, even if firms are symmetric,
the efficiency effect prevails on the competition effect. In contrast with Bloch
[1996], not only the number of coalitions matters but also the size of the coalition.
Coalitions have both a positive and a negative effect, according to the definition
of externality proposed by Yi [1997].
No investment: x1 = x2 = x3 = 0 [Bloch, 1996]
Coalition Structure MC Profit per capita Total profit
{1,2,3} c = 4 pi = 3 9
{1,2} {3} c1 = 4 c2 = 4 pi1 = 2 pi2 = 4 8
{1} {2} {3} c1 = c2 = c3 = 4 pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 2.25 6.75
The stable coalition is the grand coalition.
Asymmetric investment: x1 = 1 x2 = x3 = 0
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Coalition Structure MC Profit per capita
{1,2,3} c = 3 pi = 4.08
{1,2} {3} c1 = 3 c2 = 4 pi1 = 3.55 pi2 = 2.77
{1,3} {2} c1 = 3 c2 = 4 pi1 = 3.55 pi2 = 2.77
{2,3} {1} c1 = 4 c2 = 3 pi1 = 1.38 pi2 = 7.11
{1} {2} {3} c1 = 3 c2 = 4 c3 = 4 pi1 = 5.0625 pi2 = pi3 = 1.5625
The stable coalition structure is the singleton solution, this is because firm 1 can
create a coalition more efficiently than the other two firms and can therefore exploit
the Cournot competition at his favour.
Asymmetric investment: x1 = x2 = 1 x3 = 0
Coalition Structure MC Profit per capita
{1,2,3} c = 2 pi = 5.33
{1,2} {3} c1 = 2 c2 = 4 pi1 = 5.55 pi2 = 1.77
{1,3} {2} c1 = 3 c2 = 3 pi1 = 2.72 pi2 = 5.44
{2,3} {1} c1 = 3 c2 = 3 pi1 = 2.72 pi2 = 5.44
{1} {2} {3} c1 = 3 c2 = 3 c3 = 4 pi1 = pi2 = 4 pi3 = 1
The stable coalition structure is characterized by the most efficient firms joining
the same coalition. In this case, a firm with an investment prefers to stay with
another firm with an investment and than compete with the other firms because
they will be much more efficient with respect to the other firms.
In this simple reduced form of the model it emerges that firms are willing to
give up monopoly profits if they can form a coalition structure such that the most
efficient firms are in the same coalition.
Let us consider the investment decision of each firm at date 1.
Proposition 8 The outcome of the unique Subgame Nash Equilibrium of game
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Γ0 is the grand coalition for any level of φ, with the SPE characterized by (i)
{a1 = a2 = a3 = 1} if φ ≤ 3.75 and (ii) {a1 = a2 = a3 = 0} if φ > 3.75.
The reason is that firms prefer to invest if their net outcome is higher than
what they can get by not investing.
A.3 Weighted sharing rule
We now present the same exercise as in the previous section, using a different
sharing rule: the weighted sharing rule. We keep the assumption α = 1.
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit Tot Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c = 9 pi1 = 41.18 pi2 = pi3 = 34.54 Π = 110.25
P2 {1,2} {3} c1 = 9 c2 = 10 pi1 = 32.33 pi2 = 21.45 pi3 = 40 Π = 93.8¯
P3 {1} {2,3} c1 = 9 c2 = 9 pi1 = 53.7¯ pi2 = pi3 = 20.05¯ Π = 93.8¯
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c1 = 9 c2 = c3 = 10 pi1 = 33.06 pi2 = pi3 = 22.56 Π = 78.19
Notice a slight change in notation: with pii we denote the payoff of firm i. This
change is necessary because members of a coalition may have different payoffs.
The main difference with the previous game is the non equal division of the worth
in the grand coalition. Since firm 1 invested in the previous stage, she gets more
than the other firms. However, the grand coalition is still stable.
TWO Investors ⇒ x1 = 1 x2 = 1x3 = 0
Coalition Structure Cost Function PerCapita Profit Tot Profit
P1 {1,2,3} c = 10− 2α pi1 = pi2 = 43.08 pi3 = 34.83 Π = 121
P2 {1,2} {3} c12 = 10− 2α c3 = 10 pi1 = pi2 = 32 pi3 = 36 Π = 100
P3 {1,3} {2} c13 = 10− α c2 = 10− α pi1 = 29.66 pi3 = 19.34 pi2 = 49 Π = 98
P∗ {1}{2}{3} c1 = c2 = 10− α c3 = 10 pi1 = pi2 = 30.25 pi3 = 20.25 Π = 80.75
Two firms have acquired the cost-saving asset. The grand coalition is not
stable because the two efficient firms prefer to stay together rather than separate.
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This is actually exploited by the inefficient firm that would deviate in the grand
coalition. Notice that in case of an “equal” sharing rule, the grand coalition would
be stable, because for the inefficient firm it would be no more profitable to deviate.
In this case, we can draw two main conclusions, firms tend to merge with firms
which have acquire an asset in order to exploit the synergy. The same synergy,
however, makes it profitable for the inefficient firm to deviate from the grand
coalition.
Investment decision. We now consider the first stage of the game, where
firms simultaneously decide whether to invest. In the next table we present a
summary of firms’ payoff in each stable coalition structure.
Investment decision Stable Coalition Structure Individual payoff
All invest {i,j} {k} (pii = pij = 29.38¯) pik = 44.4¯
No investment {i,j,k} pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 33.3¯
ONE invests xi = 1 {i,j,k} pi1 = 41.18 (pi2 = pi3 = 34.54)
TWO invest xi = xj = 1 {i,j} {k} (pi1 = pi2 = 32) pi3 = 36
The difference with the outcome of the “equal” sharing rule, relates to the two
asymmetric situations: one invests and two invest. When only one firm invests the
grand coalition is still stable, but there is a different distribution of worth among
firms. When two firms invest the grand coalition is no longer stable.
Given the cost of investment φ, we have the following SPE,
Proposition 9 The Subgame Perfect equilibrium of the game Γ(N = 3, x, σ(S))
depends on the cost of investment φ,
B if φ < 7.85, at date 1 only one firm invests, at date 2 the grand coalition
forms;
B if φ > 7.85, at date 1 nobody invests, at date 2 the grand coalition forms.
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A comparison between the equilibrium under the “equal” and the “weighted”
sharing rule, shows that with the latter the cost level at which investing is not
convenient for anybody is higher, from 3.75 to 7.85. However, with the “weighted”
sharing rule there is no possibility of having more than one firm to acquire the
cost-saving technology.
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